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Globally, there is no lack of security threats. Many of them demand priority engagement 
and there can never be adequate resources to address all threats.  In this context, climate 
is just another aspect of global security and the Arctic just another region.  In light of 
physical and budgetary constraints, new security needs must be integrated and prioritized 
with existing ones.  This discussion approaches the security impacts of climate from that 
perspective, starting with the broad security picture and establishing how climate may 
affect it.  This method provides a different view from one that starts with climate and 
projects it, in isolation, as the source of a hypothetical security burden.1  That said, the 
Arctic does appear to present high-priority security challenges.  
 
Uncertainty in the timing of an ice-free Arctic affects how quickly it will become a 
security priority.  Uncertainty in the emergent extreme and variable weather conditions 
will determine the difficulty (cost) of maintaining adequate security (order) in the area.  
The resolution of sovereignty boundaries affects the ability to enforce security measures, 
and the U.S. will most probably need a military presence to back-up negotiated 
sovereignty agreements.  Without additional global warming, technology already allows 
the Arctic to become a strategic link in the global supply chain, possibly with northern 
Russia as its main hub.  Additionally, the multinational corporations reaping the 
economic bounty may affect security tensions more than nation-states themselves.  
Countries will depend ever more heavily on the global supply chains.  China has 
particular needs to protect its trade flows.  In matters of security, nation-state and 
multinational-corporate interests will become heavily intertwined.  
 
                                                 
1 Because of the rapid outpouring of climate change information, this report not only uses scientifically 
vetted resources (often several months behind current events), it also uses crosschecked news releases. The 
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Many organizations and institutions recognize the need to consider the potential security 
implications of climate change.2,3,4,5  While climate may exacerbate the security situation 
in already sensitive areas, the Arctic presents a (potentially rapid) emergent theater of 
security concerns.  Arctic security affair will evolve over the years and the initial 
response will most probably by unsuitable and inadequate for future needs.  Conversely, 
developing a long-rang response may prove to be unsuitable and inadequate for nascent 
needs.   
 
With its mission of national security, research at Sandia National Laboratories is 
evaluating the impact of climate change within the Arctic.  A sister study addresses the 
physical impacts of uncertainty on the timing and extent of climate change on Arctic 
security priorities.6  This report presents the implications for the underlying drivers of 
security within the changing Arctic. 
 
The opening of the Arctic presents many security challenges because of the high potential 
it has for changing global economic (and thereby, geo-political) power balances.  Once 
the Arctic becomes economically exploitable, it may provide a large fraction of new 
global oil, gas, and mineral reserves.  The adequate open-water conditions of the future 
will also 1) allow a dramatic increase in shipping, 2) could spur spectacular infrastructure 
and processing development along the route and 3) elevate inevitable economic and 
strategic competition. The convergent trade routes (and local resources) will present a 
major economic boon for parts-assembly product-finishing and for the refining of 
raw/bulk materials into high-value products.  This added economic expansion could 
radically complicate law enforcement, environmental protection, and peacekeeping 
activities in the Arctic.   
 
With recognition of the fact that good science requires the existence of dissenting views, 
there is a strong consensus agreement among scientists about anthropogenic climate-
change.7 Further, there is growing confidence in the models used to understand future 
                                                 
2 The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate 
Change, Center for Strategic & International Studies and Center for New American Security, 
November 2007, http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?1278   and 
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf  
3 National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia,  2007 
http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/      
4 Climate Change Will Have Destabilizing Consequences, Intelligence Agencies Warn, US News and 
World Report,  June 25, 2008 http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/2008/06/25/climate-change-will-
have-destabilizing-consequences-intelligence-agencies-warn.html  
5 Climate Change and Security, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Issue Volume 64, Number 2,  pp. 19-60, 
May/June 2008 http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/926l0jg36j374838/  
6 Ivey, Mark, Mark Boslough, Mark Taylor, Bernard Zak, and George Backus, Arctic Climate Change 
Impacts on National Security, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND Report, Albuquerque, NM, 2008 
7 The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, Science 3, Vol. 306, no. 5702, p. 1686, December 2004,  
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/306/5702/1686 
8 
climate conditions.8  The work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) represents the mainstream scientific assessment.9  However, IPCC results only 
portray those aspects of climate-change science fully supported by historical data and 
vetted computer simulations.  These measured results reveal significant changes in the 
latter part of the 21st century, but the projections focus mainly on best estimates whose 
graphical representations show relatively gradual change over the next decade.  
Nonetheless, other assessments for the Arctic, which support and give detail to the IPCC 
work, create a disturbing picture even when viewed in the longer timeframe.10   Recent 
studies indicate more rapidly changing impacts, especially in the Arctic, where dramatic 
changes (e.g., an ice-free Arctic) may occur in as little as five years.11 This is a difference 
of 60 years compared to the IPCC assessment. Other scientists believe that the Arctic 
crossed the “tipping point” last year, where reinforcing phenomena will now accelerate 
changes further.12 One recent study presents evidence that life-extinguishing levels of 
abrupt climate change can occur in year-level timeframes.13  This year continued a rapid 
reduction on Arctic ice-cover.14  The assessment in this report assumes the intermediate, 
non-catastrophic situation where the Arctic Ocean becomes assessable for rapid 
economic exploitation during the next decade, with ever-increasing levels of access 
thereafter.  
 
Rapid climate change has the potential to cause ruinous shifts in economic and political 
fortunes.  As discussed in the next section, the historical record then shows a close link 
between economic/political disruptions and volatile security conditions. Thus, changes in 
economic and political status guide the assessment of future security dynamics.  
Economic assessments to date overlay the future climate change on the existing economic 
and demographic conditions. There is an assumption of increased mineral exploration and 
shipping activity, but often only a limited perspective on the implied (larger) knock-on 
effects. This analysis attempts to avoid a linear, one-cause-one-effect outlook.  It also 
includes the implications of climate change as not being a single event but rather as being 
a process of continual transformation.  In that framework, territorial claims and 
permafrost degradation play a supporting role to the broader security circumstances, as 
constrained by these underling realities.  Hence, as presented below, the evolution of and 
                                                 
8 Climate Models Look Good When Predicting Climate Change, Science Daily, Apr. 6, 2008,  
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080402100001.htm  with the full study at:  
http://www.inscc.utah.edu/~reichler/publications/papers/Reichler_07_BAMS_CMIP.pdf  
9 IPCC Fourth Assessment, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,  Geneva, 2007,  
http://www.ipcc.ch/  
10 Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (ACIA), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004, http://amap.no/acia/  
11 Meltdown in the Arctic is speeding up, The Observer, August 10 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/aug/10/climatechange.arctic  
12 Arctic ice 'is at tipping point, BBC News,  UK, 28 August 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7585645.stm     
13 Jørgen, Peder Steffensen, et al., Abrupt Climate Change Happens in Few Years 
High-Resolution Greenland Ice Core Data Show, Science 321, pp. 680-684,  2008, 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/sci;321/5889/680.pdf   and 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/sci;321/5889/650.pdf  
14 No 2008 record for Arctic sea ice, BBC News, 16 September 2008,   
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7619770.stm 
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response to security risks are hampered by a continually changing physical setting, and 
thereby, a changing political and economic environment. 
 
This report neglects several security aspects of climate change other than to note them 
here: Migration could cause cascading demands on not only receiving and donor nations 
but would generate pressures also on the supporters and adversaries of those nations, and 
on international peacekeepers and aid suppliers. These demands can compete with or can 
spill over into Arctic tensions.  Climate-induced disease vectors and natural disasters can 
amputate nation-state leadership and create power voids where factional entities (and 
their allies) compete to the same affect.  Rapidly evolving land-use changes can amplify 
climate change impacts and bring on the instigating agricultural collapse, migration, and 
disease.15  Further, financial market stability may be an early victim of climate-change 
due to changes in national and corporate fortunes from transient or sustained extreme 
weather and environmental conditions (e.g. melting of permafrost and change in 
hydrological cycle).  Financial destabilization is often a source of civil destabilization. 
Later observations will note the high-stake investment flows the Arctic can precipitate for 
companies and nations – with their sensitivity to financial stability.  In fact, the large 
financial flows espoused for mitigation efforts may themselves be financially 
destabilizing. Lastly, some would also argue that efforts to provide Arctic security 
promote a balance-of-power “arms-race” that increases conflict opportunities.16  
 
This report does attempt to address Arctic-region security dynamics caused by geo-
political and accelerated economic activity.    Oil, gas, and mineral exploration along 
with expanded shipping operations will jump-start the Arctic “gold rush,” but the re-
location of secondary and tertiary infrastructure in the supply chain to the Arctic region 
may be the primary drivers of Arctic economic expansion.  Protecting those supply 
chains, the enforcing of rights and renegotiation of poorly defined rights within a 
jurisdiction, and safeguarding multinational/nation-state interests could require 
significant resources.  Shifting climate conditions will further alter the 
effectiveness/requirements of US security forces over time. 
 
For assessing security needs in the Arctic, the question is not “What security risk happens 
when the Arctic opens?’ but rather “How will security risks evolve as the geo-political 
and economic-expansion plays out?”  The physical speed with which the Arctic changes 
will determine the gap between reality and expectations, and will shape the perceived 
threat from the unexpected setbacks.  This perceived status-gap and the ability to cope 
with changing circumstances appear to define the trigger of conflict.17   Early slow 
dynamics in the Arctic can allow all parties to co-evolve toward balanced positions.  
                                                 
15 Landcover Changes May Rival Greenhouse Gases As Cause Of Climate Change  
 Goddard Space Flight Center, October 01, 2002, 
http://www.gsfc.nasa.gov/topstory/2002/20020926landcover.html  
16 Haldén,  Peter, The Geopolitics of Climate Change: Challenges to the International System, FOI - 
Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, December 2007   
http://www.foi.se/upload/projekt/Climatools/Rapporter/FOI-R--2377--SE.pdf  
17 Backus, G. A. and Glass, R. J., An Agent-Based Model Component to a Framework for the Analysis 
of Terrorist-Group Dynamics, Sandia National Laboratories,  SAND2006-0860, Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, 2006 https://cfwebprod.sandia.gov/cfdocs/CCIM/docs/06_0860P_ConceptualModel1.pdf    
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Rapid dynamics can abruptly change political, military, and economic standing, with 
consequently raised tensions.  Because climate-change will produce an ever-shifting 
playing field, relative status is more important that absolute status, and relative change is 
more important than absolute change. 
 
The next sections of this chapter explore: 1) categorizing the risk prioritization of climate 
change, 2) economic transitions in the Arctic and its national security implications. 3) the 
United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea and its relation to security risk,  4)  
multinational-corporation and nation-state intersections creating the security landscape, 
5) contributions of Russia and China to arctic security dynamics, 6) security constraints 
from the severity of the Arctic environment, 7) security constraints from the fragility of 
the Arctic environment,  8) security (cost) constraints from the expansiveness within the 
Arctic, and 9) impacts of Arctic changes on southern-hemisphere security. 
11 
2.0 Risk Prioritization of Climate Change 
 
Is there really a security risk from climate change in the Arctic or only paranoia based on 
speculation?  If there is a risk, how does it compare to other priorities, what are the 
pragmatic implications, and what are the timing constraints for an effective response?  
The answers to these questions require recognition of the uncertainty in future climate 
conditions and recognition that it is not just climate change, but also the consequences of 
climate change on human behaviors that form the chain of security strains. 
 
2.1 Scientific Versus Engineering (Security) Risk 
 
Security assessments use engineering risk, not scientific risks.  The difference is that 
engineers use conservative design criteria for realizable worst-case scenarios, whereas 
scientists focus on the most probable outcome.  There is high confidence that climate 
change is real. There is also large uncertainty on how fast and how dramatically it will 
evolve.18  Science generally lags data. It takes time to accumulate the data to support (or 
falsify) scientific assertions with any sense of confidence.  Recent data, primarily events 
in the Arctic, however, do indicate that the aspects of climate change, where science has a 
limited understanding, are causing changes that are much faster and far more dramatic 
than the best estimates for most probable predictions.19  Many scientists now believe that 
we have crossed the tipping-point where climate change will accelerate due to reinforcing 
interactions within the environment itself. The best knowledge and models available to 
address the current conditions indicate the events will simply occur 40 to 60 years earlier, 
and much more abruptly, than anticipated. 20  Still, this means an ice-free Arctic can 
occur within the next 5 years.21   Further, the yet-to-be understood processes that cause 
the timing underestimation could provide additional near term surprises, as well as the 
regional and global feedbacks associated with an ice-free Arctic. 
 
To imbue popular political acceptance, mainstream climate assessment efforts must 
minimize scientific risk. Scientific risk minimization entails the maximal use of data to 
support analyses and conclusions. In science, it is better to “conservatively” 
underestimate change rather than to endanger credibility.  Conversely, security concerns 
relate to engineering risks.  Engineering risk minimization entails the maximal use of 
contingency planning and uncertainty analyses to ensure acceptable outcomes under all 
                                                 
18 Working Group I Report "The Physical Science Basis", IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, Geneva, 2007, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-
wg1.htm  
19 See note 12 above. 
20 For the first time in human history, the North Pole can be circumnavigated, The Independent, London, 
UK, 31 August 2008  
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/for-the-first-time-in-human-history-the-north-
pole-can-be-circumnavigated-913924.html  
21 Arctic Ice on Track for Another All  Time Low,  Wired,  August 28, 2008  
http://blog.wired.com/wiredscience/2008/08/arctic-ice-on-t.html  based on  Whelan, J., Maslowski, W., 
Clement Kinney, J.L., Jakacki, J. Understanding Recent Variability in the Arctic Sea Ice Thickness and 
Volume - Synthesis of Model Results and Observations, Eos Transactions of the American Geophysical 
Union (52): Fall Meeting Suppl., Abstract C22A-06,  2007 
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realizable conditions. Thus for security assessments, it is better to “conservatively” place 
bounds on the envelope of possibilities and not have conditions outside the expected 
norm blind side decision-makers.  Climate change characterizes the future weather 
variability (and its impacts) from the norm.  Consequently, security assessments anchored 
in projections based on minimizing scientific risk overlook the primary drivers for the 
security dynamics.  For this reason, we must make the careful distinction between 
“scientific conservatism” and “engineering conservatism” -- which are essentially 
antonyms in this context. 
 
Certainty is seldom a part of decision-making and uncertainty (risk) is definitely part of 
the security equation.  Because the weighting of uncertainty toward larger climate 
impacts and large impacts mean larger consequence, dealing with the risk is essentially 
unavoidable.  Because of the high costs in managing risk and the necessary priority trade-
off with other existing risks, the decision to add climate change risk as a priority requires 
a quantified understanding of the uncertainty, assessment of potential consequences, and 
a process for validated, risk-informed decision making.22 
  
What are the security risks from climate change?  A recent British study notes: 
 
“Climate change is just one component of the larger problem of direct manmade 
environmental change. That said, climate change alone is likely to cause 
international legal disputes, disrupt access to vital resources, and damage critical 
infrastructure.” 23 
 
The actual risk, however, is not from climate change itself, but rather the consequence of 
the climate change.  Droughts, less food, and mass migrations present possibly global 
humanitarian threats, but in themselves, they are not security threats.  Thus, the security 
risk stems from the geo-political response to the socio-economic consequence of the 
physical climate change.  Note that the climate change uncertainty itself does not dilute 
claims of uncertainty in physical, socio-economic, or geopolitical consequences.  When 
climate change occurs, changes in physical and socio-economic conditions are a 
certainty. In these circumstances, the adjustment involves changes in relative status quo. 
That is, there will be winners and losers.  Even among the losers, there will be degrees of 
loss, which will change relative economic status in a way that those at the bottom will 
probably perceive as unfair.  In such an atmosphere, risk of a geo-political response is 
then also certain.  The purpose of security measures are to respond to probable-risks 
because predicting actual hostile events, timing, and import is not the basis for military 
and safeguard preparedness. 
                                                 
22 Boslough, M. and T. Trucano, Verification and Uncertainty Quantification of Radiative Forcing and 
Climate Sensitivity Estimates, Sandia National Laboratories, Sand Report 2008-XXXX, Albuquerque, 
NM, 2008 
23 Paskal, Cleo, How climate change is pushing the boundaries of security and foreign policy, The Royal 





2.2 International Security Perspectives 
  
The IPCC lays out the broad physical consequences of climate change, albeit, possibly in 
too scientifically conservative of a sense relative to timing.24 The Navy has considered 
the types of missions the U.S. would encounter in an ice-free Arctic: “1) law enforcement 
operations; 2) ensure freedom of navigation; 3) protection of natural resources; 4) transit 
of forces; 5) homeland defense; 6) forward presence, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR); 7) scientific exploration; 8) maintain/improve capability to operate 
in the Arctic; 9) uphold allied commitments.”25  While these are all important missions, 
the prioritization may depend on the potential for conflict – and potential for the conflict 
to expand.  There are differing views on whether the stress climate imposes on resource 
competition actually correlates with international tensions.  Some researchers argue that 
the evidence is insufficient to draw conclusions.26 Others argue that historical evidence 
confirms the impact of climate change on conflict incidence.27,28  The changes in the 
Arctic may make these arguments moot, because the issue is neither directly about 
climate-change nor about climate-induced loss of resource access.  The opening Arctic 
simply creates a “new world” with dynamics not unlike those experienced in 16th and 
17th-century North and South America.  The issues pin on the sovereignty boundaries and 
limitations. As will be discussed in the next two sections, the motivating interests of all 
parties are already well defined.   
 
European researchers warn of new social and security risks arising from potential 
conflicts over newly accessible minerals29, and the European Union notes its concerns for 
the Arctic focus on the sovereignty debate:   
 
                                                 
24 International Scientific Panel Approves Report on Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability, U.S. Climate Change Science Program, Press release, 6 April 2007  
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/pressreleases/pressrelease6apr2007.htm  and Synthesis report. 
Summary for Policymakers, Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland 2007 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf     
25 Naval Operations in an Ice-Free Arctic, Symposium Final Report, Office of Naval Research (ONR), pp 
36-37, April 17-18 2001.  http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/FinalArcticReport.pdf  
26 Buhaug, Halvard; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Ole Magnus Theisen,. Implications of Climate Change for 
Armed Conflict, World Bank,  Washington, DC, 2008 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/SDCCWorkingPaper
_Conflict.pdf 
27 Arctic Climate Impact Science,  WWF International Arctic, Oslo, Norway, April  2008 
www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/arctic_climate_report.pdf  
28 Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1994 Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 5-40, Summer 1994, 
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/evidence/evid2.htm 
29 Herrmann, G,  Gereiztes Klima nach dem Tauwetter.Die Erderwärmung lässt das Arktis-Eis schmelzen – 
nunstreiten Anrainerstaaten um freiwerdende Bodenschätze wie Öl und Gas. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
Munich, 2006 http://jetzt.sueddeutsche.de/texte/anzeigen/340764 and World in Transition – Climate 
Change as a Security Risk, German Advisory Council on Global Change, Earthscan, London 2007  
http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2007_engl.html  
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“The speed of polar ice cap melting will have a large geostrategic impact, with 
conflicts likely over the vast new mineral resources that will become accessible, as 
well as the opening of new sea routes for international trade. Rival claims to the 
mineral wealth and shipping routes will challenge Europe's ability to secure its 
interests in the region.” 30 
 
“There is an increasing need to address the growing debate over territorial claims 
and access to new trade routes by different countries which challenge Europe's 
ability to effectively secure its trade and resource interests in the region and may put 
pressure on its relations with key partners.”31 
 
Russia’s eminent dominance in the Arctic denotes a particular concern.  Mineral rights 
may motivate aggressive stances, but relatively less contentious items such as fishing 
rights may create an environment where tensions accumulate.32  To ensure sovereignty, 
analysts believe Russia will militarize the Arctic to back-up boundary disputes33 and that 
the military risk is both real and significant.34 Russia has long wanted to be a maritime 
nation. The Russian side of the Arctic will open sooner than the North American side. 
This will give them an upper hand is securing their domain of influence through 
experience and the early placement of assets.35  The early use of the sea-lanes could also 
be a source of conflict with Russia due to issues of jurisdiction.36   
 
Russian nationalism appears to already motivate actions that are cast in-terms of 
geopolitics and military-intent. 
                                                 
30 EU told to prepare for flood of climate change migrants, The Guardian, Monday March 10 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/mar/10/climatechange.eu  
31 Climate change and international security, Council Of The European Union, 7249/08, Brussels, 3 
March 2008 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf  
and Climate Change And International Security, Paper from the High Representative and the European 
Commission to the European Council, European Union, S113/08, 14 March 2008 
http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/SolanaCCsecurity%20reportpdf_tcm29-170886.pdf  
32 Traynor, Ian,  Climate change may spark conflict with Russia, EU told Alert over scramble for control of 
energy resources in the Arctic, The Guardian, Monday March 10 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/10/eu.climatechange  




34Borgerson, Scott G., Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, 
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87206/scott-g-
borgerson/arctic-meltdown.html   
35 Corell,  Robert W., The Science of Climate Change, in Global Climate Change National Security 
Implications, Carolyn Pumphrey (ed.)  Strategic Studies Institute,  Triangle Institute for Security Studies. 
Army War College (U.S.). Carlisle Barracks, PA., 2008, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB862.pdf  
36 Chalecki, Elizabeth, He Who Would Rule: Climate Change in the Arctic and Its Implications for U.S. 
National Security, paper presented at the International Studies Association, Chicago, 2007. 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/maritime/documents/ArcticSecurity.pdf  and 
http://www.princeton.edu/~jpia/pdf2007/Chalecki%20Chapter%2010%20.pdf  
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“The Arctic is perceived as a geopolitical “frontier” where Russia should use its 
competitive advantages and assert its claims since the readiness to advance its own 
interests, even if not of immediate character, is presumed to constitute an 
additional source of strength.”37 
 
“The main line of Russia’s Arctic intrigue goes however towards the US, and the 
Kremlin expects that it would constitute a separate dimension in the complex 
relationship where the elements of confrontation and cooperation coexist but 
tensions tend to escalate as the hyper-power in decline seeks to check the rise of an 
independent power center.  The main source of risk in this rather simplistic picture 
is not that the US leadership would decide that Moscow had allowed itself one 
liberty too many, but that the four Arctic states—plus possibly the UK—who all 
happen to be NATO member-states, could join forces against Russia. The 
experiments with combat patrolling by Strategic Aviation could actually increase 
the probability of such coalition-building, so Moscow has to take into account the 
possibility that the concerned neighbors might find some forceful collective replies 
to its challenges.”38 
 
 
U.S. planning to balance potential Russian ambitions becomes very problematical if the 
Arctic opens much faster than expected.  The strategy to manage Arctic security may 
vary significantly depending on the time horizon for implementation.   
 
European concerns link the Canadian-side access with the Russian-side access to the 
Arctic as a strategic military complication: 
The Northwest Passage, a long-sought sea route linking the Atlantic and Pacific, 
opened up the last three years, [Walt] Meier [U.S.] said.  Last year, the Parry 
Channel -- deep enough for large ships to pass -- opened for the first time, he said. 
… ``It's advantageous for shipping and in a military-conflict situation,'' [Cleo] 
Paskal [UK]  said. ``It needs to be managed very carefully for it not to be another 
destabilizing factor in geopolitical affairs.'' … Of the northern nations, Russia has 
a ``big advantage in strategic control over the Arctic'' because it has ports on the 
permafrost and a fleet of icebreaker ships, Paskal said.39  
                                                 
37 Baev, Pavel, Russia’s Race for the Arctic and the New Geopolitics of the North Pole, The Jamestown 
Foundation, Washington, D.C. 2007. http://www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-BaevRussiaArctic.pdf 
38 See note 37 above. 
39 Arctic Ice Retreat May Be Harbinger of Climate Change, Bloomberg, September 17, 2008,  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=aFLKxIyTHX8Q&refer=canada 
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China has a large stake in the Arctic as well. As a trading nation, the Arctic routes reduce 
costs and diversify strategic supply chains.  As consumers, they will also be eager to 
utilize the energy resources:    
 
“Chinese demand for … resources may fundamentally alter [global] shipping 
patterns if the Arctic sea ice recedes and the Arctic routes become routinely 
navigable.”40  
 
A later section will more fully discuss the influence of the Russian and Chinese interests 
on U.S. security decisions, but uncertainty in how fast the Arctic will become 
economically accessible merely governs how immediate the pre-existing sovereignty 
tensions demand military backing for diplomatic resolution.  
 
 
                                                 
40 Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Committee on the Assessment of 
U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and Future Needs, National Research Council, Washington, DC, 
pg. 33,  2007 http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753  
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3.0 Economic Transitions in the Arctic and Its National Security 
Implications 
 
The reduction in Arctic ice coverage may quickly open the Arctic for routine, seasonal 
marine transport. The length of the season may “naturally” grow rapidly, but the 
intensive use of icebreakers may also greatly extend the shipping season beforehand.  
With its nuclear-power icebreakers, the Russians claim they already have year-round 
service. 
 
The nuclear icebreaker fleet, operated by the Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC) 
for the Ministry of Transportation, services the western section of the route 
extending from Murmansk to River Lena as well as river ports on major Siberian 
rivers. The Arctica-class icebreakers can open passages through 1.5–2 m thick ice, 
which is sufficient to make possible year-round navigation in the region.41    
 
Between 1982 and 2005, the summer sea-ice declined by an area equivalent of 22 
Western U.S. states, mostly on the Russian side.42  Last year a vessel reached the North 
Pole without the use of icebreakers.43  Figure 1 shows the September 2007 Arctic-ice 
conditions. In 2006, the ice peninsula at the Vilkitskiy strait of Russia that limits the use 
of the Northeast Passage opened, which appears to be the case again this year.44  Figure 1 
illustrates the Northeast Passage (more commonly called the Northern Sea Route) as the 
blue line and the Northwest Passage as the yellow line. The top linkage of the two also 
provides a now routinely open route between Canada and Russia.  Canadian oil 
companies are already expanding their use of Arctic-Canadian rivers, rail, and ports to 
access tar-sands oil.  Churchill, in Northeast Manitoba (in Hudson Bay), is experiencing 
rapidly growing demand. Going from Churchill to Russia for European market entry via 
the Arctic waterway is four days faster than attempting to ship via the Great Lakes.  In 
the Northwest Territories, Arctic maritime freight shipments increased almost 60% from 




                                                 
41 Bukharin, Oleg Russia’s Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet, Science and Global Security 14, Taylor & Francis 
Group, LLC pp.25–31, 2006 http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/14_1_25-
31_Bukharin.pdf  
42 Russia builds worlds biggest nuclear icebreaker, Pravda, 01 March 2006  
http://english.pravda.ru/science/tech/01-03-2006/76685-icebreaker-0 
43 Profiteering from the Arctic Thaw, Der Speigel, March 10, 2006, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,405320,00.html    
44 See note 20 above. 
45 Arctic melt opening sea lanes for shippers, new cargo vessels ,Bloomberg News, March 2, 2008 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&refer=Canada&sid=aQ4ROJIItxvU  with a more 
complete article at http://www.nwanews.com/adg/Business/218544/  
46 See note 20 above. 
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Figure 1:  2007 Arctic Ice Cover47 
 
Other countries and industries are well aware of the trade advantage.  Russia already has 
many icebreaker oil tankers,48 with other countries actively building both icebreaking oil 
and LNG tankers,49,50  and with numerous other countries gearing up to build icebreaker 
freighters.51  
                                                 
47 Satellites witness lowest Arctic ice coverage in history, European Space Agency, 14 September 2007, 
http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMYTC13J6F_index_0.html 
48 Icebreaker LNG carriers for Arctic Alaska gas an interesting but challenging concept, Petroleum News, 
Vol. 13, No. 24, Week of June 15, 2008, http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/114342229.shtml  
49 Noble, Peter G., Oil & Gas Exploration, Production and Transportation in the Arctic 
Symposium on the Impact of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval & Maritime Operations, U.S. Arctic 





The Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard see the recent Arctic 
changes as now transcending sterile scientific explanations. They recognize the global 
economic impacts of an opening and the security implications it may pose. 
 
“The new geo-strategic and maritime security reality such a directive will have to 
deal with includes several facets. First is the fact that the nature of US interests in 
the Arctic are likely to ratchet up considerably over the next few years. As ice melts 
in the Arctic region the area, believed to contain vast oil and gas reserves and 
other mineral riches, is likely to become far more accessible to exploration and 
development and thus the locus of hundreds of billions of dollars worth of critical 
energy and other industrial infrastructure. The rapid melting of the Arctic's 
summer sea ice will also open up the fabled Northwest Passage and other shipping 
lanes to unprecedented volumes of foreign commercial and perhaps military fleets, 
taking advantage of new routes that drastically cut the distance and expense of 
Europe to Asian voyages that now are routed through the Panama canal.”52   
 
Although the arctic remains a severe environment,53 it appears that the enduring 
reduction in ice-cover, minimized transportation costs, and new technology now makes 
the use of the Arctic economically advantageous. By  the end of 2008, as much as 10% of 
the commercial tanker can ply frozen waters and the 152 ice-capable-vessel order-
backlog is 50% of the current worldwide fleet.54   In the interim, Russia has a growing 
fleet of between 7-18 full-capability icebreakers that can escort vessels and maintain 
trade routes.55,56,57,58  
 
With open Arctic water and rivers, Russia can ship Siberian goods north to foreign ports 
making them accessible to global markets.  It can tap its vast mineral resources and 
deliver high-value processed goods made from them.  The Arctic not only opens up a 
immense wealth of mineral resources, it now acts as a common confluence for all traded 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 Carman, Jessie C., Economic and Strategic Implications of Ice-free Arctic Seas. Chapter 9 of 
Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University, Washington, DC,  2002. 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/10_ch09.htm 
51 See note 45 above. 
52 The Arctic Heats Up As Security Focus, Homeland Security Today, 11 August 2008, 
http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/4655/149/ 
53 Arctic Ice Hints at Warming, Specialists Say, New York Times, September 6, 2008 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/science/earth/07arctic.html?partner=rssyahoo&emc=rss  
54 See note 45 above. 
55 A Push to Increase Icebreakers in the Arctic, New York Times, August 17, 2008 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17arctic.html?ref=environment 
56 Eight of which Russia claims are nuclear powered.  See note 42 above.  
57 Arctic shipping set to explode in legal vacuum, experts warn, Agence France Presse,  September 8, 
2008 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080908/sc_afp/arcticjusticeenvironmentshippingtourism_080908174031  
58 Conflict fear over Arctic borders, BBC News, 10 September 2008,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7606132.stm  
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commodities – which mostly represent partial products awaiting final assembly.  The 
result is an economic explosion.  Russia’s icebreakers and head-start with Arctic-water 
experience alone indicate it can lock in the greatest amount of early economic activity.59  
As will be detailed below, Russian geographical advantages will probably make it the 
hub of Arctic economic expansion and therefore the apparent source of tensions when 
economic activities clash with sovereignty issues.    
 
Estimates indicate that the Arctic routes could reduce transportation costs by an average 
of 40% on key Asian-European routes and cuts some key route distances by two-thirds.60 
A simple use of economic data61 indicates that such reductions imply that Arctic open-
water could attract up to 80% of the global transportation market.  As intimated above, 
with global supply chains all converging within the area, natural economic pressures 
argue to take the FedEx model of a “spoke & hub” to its logical extreme.62  Beyond 
making the Arctic the mother of all distribution centers, also make it the final-product 
manufacturing center. Rather than have a shirt or a machine visit 10 different countries 
before it reaches the final consumer, and since all the parts converge at the Arctic, 
assemble the product there and send it on its (short!) path to the final market. In such a 
scenario, the use of advanced automated manufacturing practices would need to 
compensate for the current lack of a large labor force in the Arctic. Japanese and Korean 
firms have the required expertise. The need for energy to run these facilities implies it 
may make sense to process energy resources locally.  If the energy infrastructure is 
available, raw materials extracted from Arctic regions can also be refined and used 
locally. Finished products have typically much more economic value (profit margins) 
than raw materials.  There are added multiplier affects for secondary industries to support 
the primary ones.63   A dollar’s worth of primary output can beget two to three or more 
added dollars of economic activity.  If the Arctic becomes economically accessible, it 
could easily become the next global economic growth engine.64 Such global impacts can 
produce significant ripple affects for the Southern hemisphere as will be discussed later.   
 
                                                 
59 See note 55 above. 
60 Research key to unlocking Arctic riches, Petroleum News , Vol. 12, No. 10  Week of March 11, 2007,  
http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/900471425.shtml  
61 Litman,  Todd, How Prices and Other Factors Affect Travel Behavior, Victoria Transport Policy 
Institute, Victoria, BC,  Canada, 26 July 2008 http://www.vtpi.org/elasticities.pdf  
62 Hudson, Scott, Success with Hub and Spoke Distribution, Supply Chain Resource Cooperative, North 
Carolina State University, accessed September 12, 2008,  
http://scm.ncsu.edu/public/lessons/less031014.html  
63 For an over view of multipliers see A User Handbook for the Regional Input-Output Modeling System 
(RIMS II),  Bureau Of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department Of Commerce, Washington, DC 20402, 
March 1997 http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/regional/perinc/meth/rims2.pdf  and see 
http://www.bea.gov/regional/rims/index.cfm for recent values in the U.S. Multipliers dynamically vary by 
country and industry and their grouping.  
64 See notes 43, 45, and 56 above. 
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Historians often argue, “Geography is destiny.”65 The physical realities of the Arctic 
region will determine where the economic entrenchment occurs first. The maps of 
Figures 2 through 4 show the results of a 2003 assessment of the  risks to significant 
infrastructure in the United States, Canada, and Russia from changes in permafrost 
temperatures for structures, transportation, electrical transmission and oil and gas 
pipelines.66  With the recent Arctic-change data noted previously, the 2003 assessment is 
mostly like an underestimation of impacts. The darker colored the area the greater the 
increased ground instability (risk) and the need for either sophisticated engineering 
solutions or limitations in using that area.  Note that central northern Russia appears to be 
in the best situation for stable land-based access to the Arctic.  Further, Russia is 
additionally in the best position to provide the processing, manufacturing and assembly 
facilities that makes the polar shipping into a game-changing economic powerhouse.  
Russia experience with Arctic shipping, mineral processing, infrastructure development, 
and security organization continues to accelerate.  
 
As a simplistic metaphor for the potential confluence of trade within the Arctic, “all the 
world’s longitude lines meet at the North Pole.”  In an ice-free Arctic, many of China’s 
sensitive supply chains would go north and south, instead of primarily east and west.  In a 
positive sense, the Straits of Malacca become less critical with an Arctic trade highway 
and an Arctic oil supermarket. This situation could relive a host of potential global 
threats.  On the other hand, extreme weather (which may become more extreme) in the 
Arctic and elsewhere, magnifies politico-economic challenges and security environment.  
As a negative effect, fewer east-west shipments would reduce the use of the Panama 
Canal with potentially damaging effects on Central and South American economies.   
 
To allow competitive economic expansion vis-à-vis Russia, the infrastructure challenges 
implied by the 2003 assessment and future environmental containment requirements 
implied by a 2006 study67 indicate that the U.S. and Canada would need to develop new 
Arctic-tolerant technologies. 
 
In summary, the move toward Arctic shipping could instigate a much greater economic 
expansion of the Arctic. Mineral/energy extraction may play a supporting, rather than 
primary role in this global economic transition.  Nonetheless, the energy industry may be 
the first to overcome technical hurdles to infrastructure development in the Arctic. Russia 
has a significant leg-up on establishing economic supremacy in the region.  
 
                                                 
65 For example see Landes, David S., The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and 
Some So Poor, New York: W. W. Norton, 1998 and Diamond, Jared,  Guns, Germs, and Steel: The 
Fates of Human Societies,  Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc., New York, July 2005 
66 Climate Change, Permafrost, and Impacts on Civil Infrastructure, U.S. Arctic Research Commission 
Permafrost Task Force), Special Report 01-03, U.S. Arctic Research Commission, Arlington, Virginia, 
ECV-T7-permafrost-ref-03, 2003 http://www.arctic.gov/files/PermafrostForWeb.pdf 






Figure 2: Risk to infrastructure. The red dots indicate population centers; the pink 
shading indicates areas of human settlement.68 
 
                                                 
68 See note 66 above. 
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Figure 3: Risk to transportation facilities. The yellow lines indicate winter trails, the blue 
lines indicate railroads, and the red dots indicate airfields. 69 
 
                                                 
69 See note 66 above. 
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Figure 4: Risks to major electrical transmission lines and pipelines.  The blue lines 
indicate electrical transmission lines, the yellow lines indicate pipelines (yellow), and the 





                                                 
70 See note 66 above. 
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4.0 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea and its 
Relation to Security Risk 
 
Many believe that the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS)71 
will 1) set the agenda for claimants of Arctic resources and surface access, and 2) act as 
the legal framework for the governance of the Arctic. The U.S. has not ratified the 
UNCLOS, which means the U.S. has limited engagement (no legal standing) with those 
negotiating under the UNCLOS rules. 72  By being outside the UNCLOS regimen, some 
would argue that the U.S. could choose those provisions most advantageous to its 
interests.73 Such an approach would confront other participants with de-facto security 
tensions. Conversely, if the U.S. did ratify UNCLOS, it would face restrictions on 
unilateral activities normally considered normal procedure, such as the use of previously 
“international” waters, which could be now deemed internal (restricted) waters.  
 
The UNCLOS’ exclusive-economic-zone (EEZ), and its possible extension by claims of 
the prolongation of the continental shelf, define the exclusive use of an area for mineral 
extraction.  Within the EEZ, the owning nation has exclusive rights over all resources, 
but foreign nations can have rights of navigation and over-flight.  Waters deemed internal 
or territorial allow potential interpretations that can restrict any foreign utilization of the 
area. Resolving sovereignty disputes (which can exchange firm boundaries for economic-
access rights in the previously disputed areas) would clearly set expectations and 
jurisdiction within the area.  Without well-defined boundaries, the possibly of conflicts 
over the right to utilize resources increases dramatically. 74   
 
For Russia, the Arctic is a key source of wealth. The importance of the Arctic to Russia is 
akin to the importance of the Gulf of Mexico for the United States (except it is about nine 
times more extensive), and similar to the comparable roles played by the Panama Canal 
for the United States.75  Russia is presently attempting to make formal claims on a large 
share of the Arctic.76 It is additionally attempting to define the Northeast Passage 
(Northern Sea Route) as Internal-Water and thereby denying the right-of-transit.77  
                                                 
71 Law of the Sea, United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm  
72 Borgerson, Scott G., Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, 
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87206/scott-g-
borgerson/arctic-meltdown.html   
73 U.S. Strategy in the Arctic: Energy, Security, and the Geopolitics of the High North, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 23, 2008 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080723_arctic_event_summary.pdf  
74 New laws needed in changing polar regions: experts, Agence France Presse, September 7, 2008, 
http://news.yahoo.com/story//afp/20080907/sc_afp/arcticantarcticjusticeenvironmentshippingtourism_0809
07172615   
75 See comments by Caitlyn Antrim in the reference of note 73 above. 
76 See note 73 above. 
77 The Arctic Ocean And Climate Change: A Scenario For The US Navy ,United States Arctic Research 
Commission,  Special Publication No. 02-1,  Arlington, Virginia 2002 
http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/NavyArcticPanel.pdf  
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Canada also wants to define the Northwest Passage as Internal-Water.78  These specific 
issues will become less problematic if further ice reductions allow shipping to take a 
more direct route through the Arctic Ocean.   
 
Without an accepted and formal framework for the legal rights within the Arctic, 
adversarial situations will be commonplace.79  The rapid opening of the Arctic is already 
causing demands to define a host of environmental and commercial laws.80,81   
 
As shown in Figure 5, the claims in the Arctic overlap already and many countries have 
not yet established their official position on claimed area.82 As noted earlier, unlike 
resource claims, sovereignty issues do show a strong history for producing conflict.  If 
there were open waters, these would be under the jurisdiction of UNCLOS’s International 
Seabed Authority (ISA).83 China and Russia are already experienced in procuring rights 
under the ISA for exploiting ocean-bed poly-metallic resource and have active 
agreements/contracts.84  Consistent with its position on UNCLOS, the U.S. is not a 
signatory of ISA and remains outside of Authority activities other than as an observer.  
To obtain legal standing, many argue for the U.S ratification of the UNCLOS.85,86  Per 
the economic discussions of the last section, financial institutions would see territorial 
title as a prerequisite for U.S. businesses to invest in the Arctic.87 
 
As per the discussion of the previous section, increased trade between Canada and Russia 
implies large traffic flows from Canadian waters, through U.S. waters, to Russian waters. 
Accident, pollution, and commercial logistics could become a nightmare when an 
incident occurs within a contested area or enforcement activities transition across 
sovereign boundaries.   
 
 
                                                 
78 Carnaghan, Matthew and  Allison Goody, Canadian Arctic Sovereignty PRB 05-61E, Political and 
Social Affairs Division, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, Canada, 26 January,  2006 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0561-e.htm  
79 For example see Currie, Duncan E.J. Sovereignty and Conflict in the Arctic Due to Climate Change: 
Climate Change and the Legal Status of the Arctic Ocean, August 5, 2007 
www.globelaw.com/LawSea/arctic%20claims%20and%20climate%20change.pdf 
80 New laws needed in changing polar regions: experts, Agence France Presse, September 7, 2008, 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jnTq2a4zaRtQl2hW-lMEc8nCtiig 
81 Arctic shipping set to explode in legal vacuum, experts warn, Agence France Presse, September 8, 
2008,  http://www.physorg.com/news140103041.html  
82 Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region,  Science Daily, August 6, 
2008http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/08/080805192723.htm  
83 International Seabed Authority, http://www.isa.org.jm/en/home 
84 http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/mcode and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Seabed_Authority  
85 US Senate panel backs Law of the Sea treaty, Reuters, October  31, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN31335584  
86 Newton, George, America’s Ocean Future Demands Accession to The Law of the Sea Treaty, US Arctic 
Research Commission, http://www.arctic.gov/files/ed-LawoftheSeaTreaty.pdf  
87 See note 73 above 
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Figure 5: Claims of Ownership Map88 
 
 
While the primary sovereignty issues relate to the five nations (U.S., Russia, Canada, 
Denmark-Greenland, and Norway) that surround the Arctic, China also has significant 
                                                 
88 Durham University United Kingdom, 2008,  http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic/  
28 
interest in the “economic and social” implications of the Arctic on China.89  It is fully 
utilizing its modern icebreaker for research that could be useful to shipping and the 
protection of such shipping in the future.90  China will need to develop and protect the 
strategic trade flows through the Arctic.  
 
Adding Islamic Terrorism into the mix of economic pressures causes security analysts to 
view the U.S. security situation as relatively complex:  
 
“However as the Arctic heats up so might a panoply of pressures on the 
sovereignty of and security of the Alaskan border. Barry Zellen,91 a specialist on 
Arctic politics and security issues at the Center for Contemporary Conflict in the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, has written of a few scenarios. 
“There might be efforts by a future Chinese navy or Islamic trading entity to test 
claims to the Arctic, perhaps to divert American and trans-polar military resources 
from other theaters of conflict,” he wrote in his recently published book . ‘Such 
potential for an indirect collision by a non-Arctic power and the United States or a 
future trans-polar bloc of nations increases in time - and this may lead to more 
forward Arctic deployments of military assets, greater efforts to protect northern 
industrial assets from potential sabotage or terror attacks, and enhanced 
surveillance and perimeter defense efforts in the Arctic region - perhaps even 
eclipsing those of the Cold War. But this all depends on what military threats 
emerge from Asia that could be projected over the top to the Arctic states.’”92 
 
The sovereignty issues combined with economic exploitation of the Arctic produce the 
time-tested ingredients for conflict risk.93 Climate change only acts to lower the physical 
hurdles that allow the economic dynamics to progress. Thus, the security risk in the 
Arctic will exist independent of additional climate change. However, progressive climate 
change can dramatically affect the speed and intensity (and uncertainty) with which the 
events unfold. Further, the physical situation dramatically affects the ability and cost to 
maintain security in the area. 
                                                 
89 Chief scientist: China's North Pole trip focuses only on climate studies, Peoples Daily (Online), July 13, 
2008 http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90781/90879/6449077.html   
90 Icebreaker Xuelong sails into Arctic, Peoples Daily (Online), August 03, 2008, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90781/6465324.html and China's Arctic expedition team starts 
research in 87 degree north latitude, Peoples Daily (Online), August 31, 2008 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6490060.html   
91 Zellen, Barry Scott, Breaking the Ice: From Land Claims to Tribal Sovereignty in the Arctic, 
Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2008 
92 The Arctic Heats Up As Security Focus, Homeland Security Today, 11 August 2008, 
http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/4655/149/ 




5.0 Multinational Corporate and Nation-State Intersections 
Create the Security Landscape 
 
A nation is its economy. When discussions focus on protecting the security of the nation, 
they are generally understood to mean the protection of its economy.  Other than in terms 
of weapons-of-mass-destruction, protecting society is synonymous with protecting the 
economy.  Nation-states depend on multinational-corporations for what are now 
primarily global supply chains.  Any Internet search produces thousands of reliable 
documents on the military of nation-states protecting multinational-company 
operations.94  Multinational security firms protect both nations and multinational 
corporations.95  Over recent history, these firms can have as much capability as the 
national military themselves.96  Conversely, multinational corporations support nations 
through needed direct investments, a tax-base, and country financial solvency through 
exports.97 Multinational corporations have interests in maintaining profitable operations; 
countries have interest in maintaining their government’s viability. Many large 
corporations such a Pemex, Saudi Aramco, and Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. are clearly 
state owned. In many countries, such as Russia and China, partial state ownership or 
political relationships blur the distinction between country and company. 98   
 
5.1 Nation and Corporation Comparability 
 
Multinational corporations may be more dominant than nation-states from a security 
perspective. This is not so much out of the need for corporations to protect their assets, 
but out of the realization that tensions among multinational corporations, or between 
countries and multinational corporations, could jeopardize security. In a globalized 
world, especially that part of it in the Arctic, multinational corporations may leverage 
more geo-political power than most of the nations involved.  
 
To illustrate the perspective that multinational corporations may be more important than 
countries to security assessments, Table 1 shows the results of converting multinational 
financial records into analogous GDPs of nations.  In the type “T” column, a “C” denotes 
a county and an “M” denotes a multinational corporation. Note that the M's vastly out 
                                                 
94 For example see Minerals in Conflict Global Policy Forum, New York,  September 11, 2008 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/mineindex.htm  
95 Foaleng, Mpako H, Private Military and Security Companies and the Nexus Between Natural Resources 
and Civil Wars in Africa, Chapter 1 of Private Security In Africa Manifestation, Challenges And 
Regulation. Institute for Security Studies, Monograph No 139, Pretoria, November 2007 
http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=30&slink_id=5920&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3  
96 Howe, Herbert, Global Order and Security Privatization National Defense University,  Institute For 
National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum Number 140,Washington DC, May 1998 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF140/forum140.html 
97 For example, see the UN working group papers concerning China.  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007SC1444:EN:HTML  
98 How the KGB (and friends) took over Russia's economy, CNN, SEPTEMBER 10, 2008 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/04/news/international/powell_KGB.fortune/index.htm   
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number the C’s and that the M's are denser as the rank number ("No." column) increases.  
There are anomalies in this approach, but the implications are unambiguous. 
 
No. T Name Value ($B/YR) No. T Name Value ($B/YR)
1 C United States $13,840.0 70 M Morgan Stanley $189.9
2 C Japan $4,384.0 71 M ConocoPhillips $189.3
3 C Germany $3,322.0 72 C Malaysia $186.5
4 C China (PRC) $3,251.0 73 C Czech Republic $175.3
5 C United Kingdom $2,773.0 74 C Colombia $171.6
6 C France $2,560.0 75 M UniCredit Group $171.4
7 C Italy $2,105.0 76 M Volkswagen Group $170.1
8 C Spain $1,439.0 77 C Nigeria $166.8
9 C Canada $1,432.0 78 C Romania $166.0
10 C Brazil $1,314.0 79 M Daimler $165.1
11 C Russia $1,286.0 80 M Merrill Lynch $164.7
12 C India $1,099.0 81 C Chile $163.8
13 C South Korea $957.1 82 C Israel $161.9
14 C Australia $908.8 83 C Singapore $161.3
15 C Mexico $893.4 84 M Generali Group $150.8
16 C Netherlands $768.7 85 M AT&T $146.5
17 C Turkey $663.4 86 M Berkshire Hathaway $145.6
18 M Royal Bank of Scotland $489.2 87 M Aviva $145.2
19 C Sweden $455.3 88 C Philippines $144.1
20 C Belgium $453.6 89 C Pakistan $143.8
21 C Indonesia $432.9 90 M Sinopec-China Petroleum $141.5
22 C Switzerland $423.9 91 C Ukraine $140.5
23 C Poland $420.3 92 C Hungary $138.4
24 M Wal-Mart Stores $395.1 93 M ENI $132.1
25 C Norway $391.5 94 C Algeria $131.6
26 M ING Group $391.1 95 C New Zealand $128.1
27 C Taiwan $383.3 96 C Egypt $127.9
28 M ExxonMobil $382.8 97 M Deutsche Post $121.2
29 M Royal Dutch Shell $382.4 98 M Carrefour Group $120.0
30 M HSBC Holdings $381.4 99 M ArcelorMittal $118.6
31 M Citigroup $378.0 100 M Hewlett-Packard $116.5
32 C Saudi Arabia $376.0 101 M Siemens $115.9
33 C Austria $373.9 102 M E.ON $114.1
34 M BNP Paribas $365.6 103 M Prudential $112.3
35 M Barclays $322.9 104 M Verizon Communications $112.2
36 M UBS $318.9 105 C Kuwait $111.3
37 C Greece $314.6 106 M IBM $110.8
38 C Denmark $311.9 107 C Peru $109.1
39 M BP $304.6 108 M EDF Group $108.8
40 C Iran $294.1 109 M Deutsche Telekom $107.9
41 M Allianz $293.9 110 M Nippon Telegraph & Tel $106.5
42 M Bank of America $290.8 111 M Nestlé $104.7
43 C South Africa $282.6 112 M Honda Motor $104.5
44 M JPMorgan Chase $272.6 113 C Kazakhstan $103.8
45 M Crédit Agricole $267.9 114 M McKesson $102.2
46 M Société Générale Group $260.8 115 M Gazprom $101.9
47 C Argentina $260.0 116 M Samsung Electronics $101.0
48 C Ireland $258.6 117 M Petrobras-Petróleo Brasil $100.5
49 M AXA Group $258.2 118 M Nissan Motor $99.5
50 M General Electric $252.3 119 M PetroChina $99.4
51 C Thailand $245.7 120 M Valero Energy $98.7
52 C Finland $245.0 121 M Munich Re $98.2
53 M Deutsche Bank $244.1 122 M StatoilHydro $97.9
54 C Venezuela $236.4 123 M Telefónica $96.7
55 M HBOS $233.9 124 M Hitachi $96.0
56 M Toyota Motor $231.4 125 M Procter & Gamble $94.2
57 M Dexia $229.8 126 M Cardinal Health $91.7
58 C Portugal $223.3 127 M BASF $91.3
59 M Fortis $223.3 128 M France Telecom $91.0
60 M Chevron $218.8 129 M Fiat Group $89.0
61 M Total $216.3 130 M Tesco $88.5
62 M American Intl Group $216.1 131 M Matsushita Electric Indl $84.1
63 C Hong Kong $206.7 132 M Peugeot Groupe $83.7
64 M Banco Santander $205.5 133 M Metro AG $83.1
65 M Credit Suisse Group $203.2 134 M Vodafone $82.7
66 M Ford Motor $200.4 135 M CVS Caremark $81.8
67 M Goldman Sachs Group $200.0 136 M Home Depot $81.8
68 M General Motors $196.0 137 M UnitedHealth Group $80.5
69 C United Arab Emirates $192.6 138 M Sony $80.4
Table 1: Economic-Power Ranking of Counties and Corporations 
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The county data for the table came originally from the CIA World Factbook99  and the 
corporate data from Forbes and Fortune magazines. 100  The table uses the data as 
compiled in Wikipedia.101 The relevant implications to be drawn do not depend on the 
precise figures. The GDP includes private consumption plus government consumption 
plus investment plus exports less imports.  Corporate reported revenue leaves out 
investments. For the purposes here, GDP consumption and corporate consumption (costs 
to the corporation and profits) are considered equivalent. The analysis omits imports and 
exports.  The corporate part of each country’s GDP is NOT subtracted out.102 (Note this 
would move the multinational ranking higher.)  Despite their importance, the analysis 
neglects state-owned corporations and sovereign-wealth funds.  This analysis also treats 
corporations partially owned by governments as if they were entirely private.  By using 
annual financial reports from representative companies to estimate an average value, the 
analysis sets corporate investment to 10% of managed-asset book-value.  All quantities 
are in billions of dollars per year and a mix of 2006 and 2007 U.S. dollars.  
 
The first and most important point is obvious. If protecting national security means 
protecting the economy, corporations dominate the security concerns. Corporations 
understand the fact that they are the entity being protected; they understand how 
important they are they are to the stability of many nations and to their multi-national 
investors, and they know how to lobby and influence outcomes as well as nations. 
 
A key generic “anomaly,” first noticed at rank 18 (for 2007), is the Bank of Scotland.103 
Data used for the Bank of Scotland show that they have nearly $3 trillion dollars of 
managed assets.  If it is like the other banks and investment firms noted in the list, its 
annual investments could far exceed 10% of assets. They could in theory buy and sell 
many countries. They could certainly influence the governments of many countries. 
(Note the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are omitted from the analysis 
by being fully “owned” by way of a consortium of countries, albeit “partially owned” by 
individual countries.)  If only 10% of the Bank of Scotland’s funds represented high-
power investments, it would still have potentially tremendous international influence on 
                                                 
99 World FactBook, CIA, Washington DC, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/  
100 The World's Biggest Companies, Forbes,  March 2,  2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/02/worlds-
largest-companies-biz-2000global08-cx_sd_0402global_land.html  and  The Fortune 500, Fortune 
Magazine, as reported by CNN, September 11, 2008,  
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/full_list/index.html 
101 List of companies by Revenue, Wikipedia, September 11, 2008, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_companies_by_revenue  and List of Countries by GDP, Wikipedia, 
September 11, 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)  
102 Note that a previous creation of this table a few years ago had the first multinational corporations 
appearing in rank thirteen (ExxonMobil). The U.S. exchange rate dramatically affects the ranking. A strong 
dollar makes the value of other countries decline in relative sense compared to the U.S. economy and U.S. 
based companies.   
103 As of September 18, 2008, due to the global financial crisis brought about by the U.S. sub-prime 
mortgage market collapse,  the Bank of Scotland (HBOS Plc) merged with Lloyds TSB Group Plc.  
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counties.104  The Bank of Scotland may not actually belong at the rank it has, but 
financial institutions do represent as powerful an economic force and security concern as, 
for example, natural-resource corporations.  The international ramifications from the 
meltdown of large financial institutions during September 2008 reinforce this view.  
 
5.2 Corporate Security  
 
As noted at the beginning of this section, nations, military forces, and corporations have 
overlapping interests and relationships. Nations could feel the need to intervene for 
corporations with armed forces for protecting what they see as national or sovereignty 
interests.  Conversely, corporations could (and have) asked nations for protection.  In the 
Arctic, natural resource companies and shipping companies from many nations, which 
are serving the strategic supply chain of other nations, will routinely  “cross paths” and 
cross sovereignty boundaries (actual and legal). Simple accidents, routine asset/personnel 
protection, or the enforcement of shipping controls may lead to confrontations among 
corporations and nations.  It is very easy to imagine a normally benign situation that 
becomes a worsening and convoluted security concern. 
  
Corporations themselves are often associated with private security forces that protect 
their assets and affect broader military conflict.  There is little evidence any corporation 
has ever considered military force outside of its self-directed protection, but the 
consequence of their activities do often spill over to security tensions previously  
considered the sole domain of nations and their adversaries.105  For example, Amnesty 
International urges boardrooms to consider the hazards with… 
 
“…the use of security forces to protect foreign installations and the dilemmas of 
operating under corrupt regimes or in war zones. All those factors, it argues, have 
become more relevant as multinational corporations play an increasingly dominant 
role in economic development.”106  
 
“Multinational corporations, especially involved in the extraction of raw materials, 
frequently collaborate closely with local security forces. … Internal armed conflicts 
may be prolonged where warring factions discover how remunerative control of 
territory containing valuable minerals can be…”107 
 
                                                 
104As a converse example to make the point, most Central Banks fear China moving its vast investments out 
of U.S. Treasury Bonds.  The recent past crises of the Ruble, Baht, and the Argentinean Peso are all 
financial (bank) crises with severe physical and political impacts. Some might even argue military impacts.   
105 Bennett, Juliette, Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict, Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 2. New York. Spring 2002, 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/57510/bennett_article.pdf 
106 A Call to Put Social Issues on Corporate Agendas, New York Times, April 6, 2000 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E4D6153FF935A35757C0A9669C8B63 
107 Human rights, big business intersect on WTO stage, SeattlePI, November 28, 1999, 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/rtejmp.shtml   
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The combination of private security forces and corporate protection needs can lead to 
conditions that engage broader conflict susceptibilities.108,109,110  Within the Arctic, the 
physical protection of off-shore assets and shipping resources, in combination with the 
host government or unilaterally by the corporations, can only complicate the dynamics of 
any security tensions that do occur.  
 
 
5.3 Russian and Chinese Corporate and National Interests 
 
Both Russia and China have particularly strong interests in the Arctic. Russia has always 
wanted to be a maritime power.111  As stated above, the Arctic is opening first on the 
Russian side and in so doing allowing Russia to establish its economic and security 
capabilities in the area. The Arctic is strategically important to Russia, and Russia is 
already the dominant player in the area.112   To maintain the Northeast Passage, Russia 
needs to keep the Vilkitskiy Strait open, but can take advantage of an already long 
shipping season along its Arctic coast.113 As noted earlier, Russia claims it can maintain 
full transport capability all year long with their advanced icebreaker fleet.114  Recent 
activities in Russia have brought control of the largest firms within Russia under the 
direct influence of Prime Minister Putin, which effectively ties corporate and national 
interest together.115 Russia clearly understands the wealth the Arctic offers.116  Russia, 
Canada, and the U.S. have already initiated heated rhetoric, based on marginal incidents, 
to escalate Arctic ownership issues.117,118  To maintain its rights at the exclusion of others, 
                                                 
108 Brooks, Stephen G., et.al.,  Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the 
Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton University Press, Princeton, January 2007 
109 Nossal, Kim, Richard, Global Governance And National Interests: Regulating Transnational Security 
Corporations In The Post-Cold War Era, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 2,  2001 
http://www.mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/issues/archive/2001(2)/06Nossal.pdf  
110 Collingsworth, Terry, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, Boston, MA, Vol. 15, Spring 2002 
111 Corell,  Robert W., The Science of Climate Change, in Global Climate Change National Security 
Implications, Carolyn Pumphrey (ed.)  Strategic Studies Institute,  Triangle Institute for Security Studies. 
Army War College (U.S.), pg. 50, Carlisle Barracks, PA., 2008, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB862.pdf 
112 Global Researcher, CQ Press,  Vol 2, Number 8, August 2008, http://www.itssd.org/CQ_Arctic.pdf  
113 Brigham, Lawson W., “Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA): Responding to Changing Arctic 
Marine Access” Symposium on the Impact of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval & Maritime Operations, 




114 Russia builds worlds biggest nuclear icebreaker, Pravda, 01 March 2006  
http://english.pravda.ru/science/tech/01-03-2006/76685-icebreaker-0 
115 How the KGB (and friends) took over Russia's economy, CNN, SEPTEMBER 10, 2008 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/04/news/international/powell_KGB.fortune/index.htm   
116 Profiteering from the Arctic Thaw, Der Spiegel,  March 10, 2006,   
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,405320,00.html   
117 Russia accused of annexing the Arctic for oil reserves by Canada, Telegraph ,  18 May 2008 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1976314/Russia-accused-of-annexing-the-
Arctic-for-oil-reserves-by-Canada.html   
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Russia is declaring currently accessible water routes as internal-water and thereby 
threatening the right-of-transit for other nations.119  This and Canada’s similar stance 
could limit U.S security operations until the Arctic-melt proceeds further north. Analysts 
believe that Russia will militarize the area to protect its economic (corporate) interests 
and claimed sovereign borders.120 
 
Russian advisors see the Arctic as central to economic expansion. 
 
“According to Professor Alexander Granberg, advisor to …Vladimir Putin, 
‘Because of the Northern Sea Route, the Arctic is the leading economic region of 
Russia. The Arctic will develop much more quickly than all of the rest of 
Russia.’”121  
 
And President Medvedev clearly places a high degree on the significance of the Arctic 
for Russia, including unilateral declarations of sovereignty. 
 
Russia should pass a law marking its territory in the disputed Arctic where it 
claims a large share of the mineral resources, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
said on Wednesday. … "We must finalize and adopt a federal law on the southern 
border of Russia's Arctic zone," Medvedev told Russia's security council according 
to Interfax news agency.  "It is our duty to our direct descendents; we have to 
ensure the long-term national interests of Russia in the Arctic."122 
 
"This region has strategic significant for us. Its development is directly tied to 
solving the long-term tasks of the state and its competitiveness on global markets," 
Medvedev said.123 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
118 USA to steal oil rich Arctic region away from Russia, Pravda, August 12, 2005 
http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/16595_arctic.html,  
119 The Arctic Ocean And Climate Change: A Scenario For The Us Navy ,United States Arctic Research 
Commission,  Special Publication No. 02-1,  Arlington, Virginia 2002 
http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/NavyArcticPanel.pdf 
120 Borgerson, Scott G., Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, 
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87206/scott-g-
borgerson/arctic-meltdown.html   
121 Hanna, USN Lieutenant Magda, In the Dark and Out In the Cold, Proceedings Magazine, U.S. Naval 
Institute Vol. 132/6/1,240, June 2006,  
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/archive/story.asp?STORY_ID=56 
122 Russia needs to mark its Arctic territory: Medvedev, Reuters,  September 17, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSLH46436320080917?feedType=RSS&feedName=scienc
eNews 




China is a global economy with growing domestic needs dependent on global supply 
chains: 
 
“China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East 
to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to 
protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives.124  The 
report also cited China’s known build up of sea-lane control weapon systems such 
as submarines, warships with long range ballistic missiles, undersea mines, 
aircraft, optical satellites, and unmanned aerial vehicles for use in the maritime 
environment.125 With this knowledge, it can be reasonably assumed that China will 
pursue enhanced Arctic capability at some point in the future, not simply for time 
and cost saving reasons, but for more suitable theater-strategic reasons. 
Specifically, China may attempt to exploit the opportunity of increased Arctic 
access so it can keep the United States at bay by taking advantage of known U.S. 
limitations in Arctic monitoring capability and lack of formidable presence in the 
region.”126  
 
China has icebreaker capabilities127 and is active in researching the Arctic, including an 
understanding of the oceanography and mapping of the seabed that would be useful for 
routing.128   
 
“China’s investment in the development and deployment of ice breaking technology 
is an indicator of its vision for the future. In 1999, a Chinese icebreaking vessel 
made an unannounced visit to Tuktoyaktuk in Northern Canada.”129   
 
China apparently designed its new nuclear submarine fleet to protect its strategic supply-
chain. 130 The Arctic routes would take pressure off the supply-chain security threats from 
the Strait of Malacca and Lombok Strait.  With an open Arctic, China’s supply-chains 
could be dominantly north-south as opposed to the current east-west dependence.  As 
noted previously, a change to the Arctic could alter global shipping patterns and alter the 
politico-economic positions of many countries.131  
                                                 
124 Ridly, Bill, China and the Final War for Resources, Energy Bulletin, 08 February 2005 
http://www.energybulletin.net/4301.html   
125 See note 124 above. 
126 Burd,  Michael L. Global Warming and the Combatant Commander: Engaging the Arctic, Naval War 
College, pg. 13,  Newport, RI, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463334&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf  
127 Conflict fear over Arctic borders, BBC News, 10 September 2008,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7606132.stm 
128 Chief scientist: China's North Pole trip focuses only on climate studies, Peoples Daily (Online), July 
13, 2008 http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90781/90879/6449077.html   
129  See note 124 above, pg 14. 
130 Global scrutiny follows reports of Chinese nuclear base, Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2008, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0513/p99s01-duts.html  
131 Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs, Committee on the Assessment of 
U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and Future Needs, National Research Council, Washington, DC, 
pg. 33,  2007 http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753 
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There are also concerns over the mutual interdependencies of Russia and China that 
could actually lead to security tensions, and which could possibly spill out in the 
Arctic.132  These possibilities depend on whether China and Russia can cooperate on 
trade and resource issues. Extrapolating China’s resource needs into the future indicates 
that they could desperately try to maintain their supply chain for Russian resources and 
those accessible via the Arctic, if faced with stiff competition from other nations.  Any 
rapid unfolding of events could derail current U.S. security planning and create 
problematic security gaps around Arctic shipping and sovereignty concerns.133 All these 
issues add to the complexity of dealing with intertwined multinational-corporation and 





                                                 
132 Fear and Loathing in Siberia, Newsweek Mar 27, 2006, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/46951?tid=relatedcl 
133 Chalecki, Elizabeth, He Who Would Rule: Climate Change in the Arctic and Its Implications for U.S. 
National Security, paper presented at the International Studies Association, Chicago, 2007. 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/maritime/documents/ArcticSecurity.pdf  and 
http://www.princeton.edu/~jpia/pdf2007/Chalecki%20Chapter%2010%20.pdf 
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6.0 Security Constraints from the Environment 
 
Climate will radically alter the physical and ecological properties of the Arctic, but many 
of its inhospitable characteristics will remain unchanged or perhaps increase. It will be a 
brutal environment spending much of its time in stormy, complete darkness.134  The 
magnitude and frequency of severe storms may increase.  Efforts to maintain security will 
be difficult and ever changing. Because of the cold, the Arctic environment will remain 
sensitive to accidents and even routine economic activities – in a milieu where the 
expected fishing industry will have the same political import as does farming in many 
temperate countries.135,136  Environmental regulation may constrain security activities. 
These severity and fragility realities combine with changing global security threats--for 
which climate is also a contributor--to challenge the U.S. ability to provide adequate 
resources for all global security needs. As such, serving the security needs in the Arctic 
may require a fundamentally different approach to the planning, technology, and 
deployment for security assets. 
 
 
6.1 Severity Constraints 
 
In the most likely projections of a future Arctic, there will be less ice-cover but more 
snow137 with more extreme weather and variability.138  In the darkness of the winter, open 
water, storms, and drifting-snow changes the morphology of sea-ice, creating additional 
hazards to already dangerous ice floes. The size distribution of ice has a long tail139 that 
will ensure a base population of unpredictable, rapidly moving, navigational hazards.140  
The momentum of a 130-foot thick patch of ice the size of Manhattan will be no match 
                                                 
134 Noble, Peter G., Oil & Gas Exploration, Production and Transportation in the Arctic 
Symposium on the Impact of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval & Maritime Operations, U.S. Arctic 
Research Commission, Washington, DC, 10-12 July 2007  
http://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/star/documents/2007IceSymp/Noble.pdf  
http://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/star/IceSymposium.php 
135 The Polar Regions, in Chapter 2: State of the Environment, UNEP,  September 11, 2008, 
http://www.unep.org/GEO2000/english/0116.htm  
136 Arctic Shipping Activities Into The Next Decade, Norwegian Maritime Directorate, Akureyri, Iceland, 
1999, http://old.pame.is/sidur/uploads/shippingactivitess.pdf ; also see 
http://old.pame.is/sidur/sidur.asp?id=13&menu=docs  
137 World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk, German Advisory Council on Global 
Change, Earthscan, pg. 132, London 2007 http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2007_engl.html  
138 See note 113 above 
139 Bitz, C.M., J. K. Ridley, M. M. Holland, and H. Cattle, 2008: 20th and 21st century Arctic Climate in 
Global Climate Models, submitted to Arctic Climate Change - The ACSYS Decade and Beyond, edited by 
P. Lemke. 2008, http://www.atmos.washington.edu/~bitz/Bitz_etal2008.pdf  
140 See note 113 above. 
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for oil and gas facilities141 -- and it will present complications to shipping and any 
response efforts for accident, enforcement and security needs.  
 
The Bering Strait will be a choke point for Asia-to-Europe shipping142 and a rapidly 
warming Arctic climate could increase the flushing rate of ice into Atlantic shipping 
corridors.143  Elsewhere, “open water in the passages over Russia, particularly, remains 
clotted with thick, dangerous floes and can also close up in a matter of hours.”144 As 
noted earlier, permafrost and hydrologic changes will require special technology for land-
based support and may require transportable security-bases to accommodate the changing 
physical and security circumstances. Only additional analysis (or painful experience) can 
determine what other emergent phenomena will confront security activities. 
 
Existing security assets were not designed for the environmental conditions associated 
with climate change.  There will be difficulties maintaining military capability due to 
extreme (and evolving) weather/climate. 145 As climate change progresses, assets will lose 
viability over time.146 The same is true for the applicability of equipment.147  The U.S. 
currently has no forward bases and no aircraft that can sustain operations in the Arctic 
theater.148 The U.S. is poorly prepared for ground war at higher latitudes.149  The highly 
variable weather in the Arctic, the total darkness in winter, and mobile ice will present 
complex situations. 150    
 
Altered physical conditions of the engagement theater will force changes in 
tactics/contingences. Bases may no longer be useable for expected activities due to 
routine extreme-weather conditions. Climate assessments151 indicate that alliance partners 
(and their budgets) could be preoccupied with climate-related disasters within their own 
territories or in non-Arctic theaters, and thus not available to aid U.S. efforts in the 
Arctic.  Climate-induced stresses and events can dictate the location, type, rapidity, and 
incidence of conflict.  
  
                                                 
141 Spotts, Peter N., Shrinking Arctic Ocean sea ice signals climate change, The Christian Science 
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To maintain a sense of control in an increasing complex physical, political, and 
commercial environments, there will be an “early-warning” need to assess emerging 
threats and the countermeasures to manage them. Given the logistical (time and material) 
constraints to operations, it will be necessary to anticipate conditions that allow realizable 
countermeasures that redirect the outcome away from catastrophic consequence. For 
example, it may be a routine situation where accident, enforcement, or actual security 
activities need to operate in an unstable physical situation while in a disputed territory.   
 
Combined behavioral and physical-climate simulations can analyze economic shifts and 
conflict potential from Arctic-route trade expansion. Given the economic and political 
conditions, modern behavioral models can aid in recognizing the potential evolution of 
conflict across regional boundaries.  The results of these analyses combined with climate, 
logistic models could then help design sensor, platform, and resource allocations that 




6.2 Environmental Constraints 
 
Within the Arctic, environmental accidents (e.g. oil or hazardous material spills) can have 
long-lived impacts that could produce severe economic, ecological, and political 
implications.  If security operations, both in preparedness and execution, cause 
environmental calamity, then international authorities (possibly encouraged by 
adversarial parties) would probably demand restrictions on operations and future 
capability.  Therefore, there is an upfront need to recognize that the design and use of 
facilities may constrain strategic and tactical function.  
 
Continued environmental change may make land or coastal areas become overly sensitive 
to environmental stresses or make them unstable, and thereby increase the potential for 
accidents that cause environmental damage. Requirements for mobile “bases” change the 
ground rules for installation planning and design.  
 
Water and air pollution have long lifetimes in the Arctic, and can exacerbate or accelerate 
the effects of climate change and ecological degradation.  Environmental laws may 
prevent the routine use of conventional (diesel) vessels in the Arctic, such as for patrols, 
training, and surveillance. The Russians have a clear advantage with their nuclear ships. 
The U.S. itself may have to quickly consider such options.   
 
In the Arctic, minimizing the footprint of security may be good for relieving both the 
environmental and cost constraints of security needs. 
 
 
6.3 Expansiveness Constraints  
 
Section 2 of this report noted the large mission space that the Arctic presented.  The 
interaction of offshore resource extraction activities, international shipping through 
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multiple sovereignty-boundaries, and the highly extreme/variable weather/ice 
environment engenders a picture of incredibly complex security-related scenarios.  
Conventional approaches to resource placement for security would not only be 
enormously expensive, they would still probably be inadequate for the evolving and 
obstacle-laden missions in the Arctic.  If the U.S. is to provide a security presence in the 
Arctic, it needs to have a highly flexible capability that minimizes the asset (cost) 
footprint.  The need is for scalable and flexible technology, and the evolving rapid 
development of new technology, that minimize cost and environmental impacts. While 
there will be times when a physical response is needed, the response will have to be 
infrequent and near the current location of responsive assets. Most probably there will not 
be time for equipment and personal to reach an area before it evolves to a more 
complicated set of problems. Certainly, icebreaking vessels will be an important part of 
the mix.152 Nonetheless, technological solutions may be able to limit the need for the 
mobilization of resources from one area to a distant area.   
 
Security forces need to use technology for monitoring, tracking and assessment, 
communication, cooperation.  This list of functions actually represents a flow.  If all five 
functions occur in near real time, multiple international resources can share tasks to 
produce the realized response.  The communication is to friend and foe; the coordination 
is also with friend and foe. A foe is a partner in maintaining controlled conditions when it 
relates to some other party. A friend can be a conventional vessel now aware of (and 
proximate witness to) any accident, enforcement or security situation. The reward 
structure of sovereignty and economics in the Arctic can actually make such an approach 
viable. The physical conditions are the common, ever present, enemy.  
 
Optimized ocean-floor, ice, and ocean-surface Sensor-Networks can provide monitoring, 
tracking and assessment.  Multi-spectral satellites can increase that information content 
and context. UAVs and long-endurance lighter-than-air instrument platforms can collect 
information and control communications.  UAVs with wingspans that are less than 4 feet 
have clocked 23-hour missions with micro-SAR and other instrumentation, while 
covering 1500km of airspace.  UAVs with five-year mission times are now considered 
possible.153  Lighter-than-air systems can be quite large, instrument packed, placed at 
altitudes above the weather, and mobile enough to allow continuous SAR imaging for 
months.  These systems also have a minimal environmental footprint.   
 
With a continuous picture of conditions, computer models can forecast potential future 
conditions and the situations they might imply. This approach generates early 
warning/leading indicators for potential accident, enforcement, and security events -- and 
false alarms that need no response beyond communication. If a situation requiring a 
response is realized, there is then a time-window large enough to improve the chances of 
mobilizing resources. More importantly, with communications, based on complete 
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knowledge of all activities in the area, minimally perturbing requests toward parties near 
the situation can intervene in many situations – often by just avoidance rather than 
engagement.  
 
This approach would require the assessment of future conditions, options, policies, and 
responses. It could assess technological requirements for the geographically shifting 
threats, amid diminished efficacy of existing resources. Most importantly, it can define 
the criteria specification and engineering solutions for evolving operational challenges in 
new Arctic conditions along an implementation sequence that minimizes cost and 
relieves planning/logistic constraints.   
 
Such assessments need to be keenly aware of uncertainty and failure modes.  The 
assessment is to allow risk informed decisions. Modern verification and validation 
methods with uncertainly quantification can ensure confidence in operational decision-
making under uncertainty for resource deployment.  
 
In the Arctic, it would seem that time and cost constraints occur at all points of 
implementation: Planning, Design, Strategic and Tactical, and Operations. In a security 
setting where anticipation is more important than actual physical response, understanding 
evolving geo-political and commercial tensions is just as important to operational 
assessment as the ocean and ice forecasts. Consequence-Evaluation and Unintended-
Consequence avoidance become key features in maintaining sustainable conditions.  
System-of-systems simulation must and can integrate across the required domains with a 
focus on unfolding dynamics rather than static assessments. These domains include 
intelligence, asset functionality, weather, climate, sensor-networks, communications, 
engineering, logistics, behavioral/political responses, commercial economics, verification 
& validation, and uncertainty quantification.  
 
In summary, the Arctic offers conditions for which conventional assets are ill suited due 
to 1) cost, 2) the timing to implement, and 3) the continuously shifting physical and 
mission nature of the theater. These constraints are overcome by being much smarter in 
anticipating essentially all options and determining the minimal physical response 
required to mitigate any concern. Advanced technology (sensors/communication) and 
information systems offer an approach to these security demands.  
42 
7.0 Impacts of Arctic Change on Southern Hemisphere Security 
 
Many of the tropical and southern hemisphere countries are already the most vulnerable 
to climate change due to droughts and the loss of agricultural productivity.154  They will 
additionally suffer economic dislocations due to changes in the Arctic.  Industrialized and 
industrializing countries will continue to demand food, oil, and mineral resources from 
these regions and may impose political alliances to ensure access.  With reduced water 
and extreme weather, these areas will require enhanced infrastructure.155 Thus, there will 
be competing demands for infrastructure investments between the Arctic and Southern 
Hemisphere. In some areas, water will be so limiting that local support of existing 
populations will become impossible.  Areas where pursuing more resource-intensive 
practices would enable the regional agriculture to still serve global needs, the demand for 
destitute labor could act as a relief valve for the inevitable mass-emigration.  In some 
areas, the regional environment or bad government could limit migratory options and 
lead to either local conflicts or humanitarian crises.156  In areas where commercial 
agriculture survives, governments will have adequate funds to maintain stability. In areas 
with massive losses of the economically productive population, and therefore losses of 
government revenues, many governments could fail. The problems swell to international 
scope if these same areas hold strategic mineral resources or they develop into magnets 
for disenfranchised (radicalized) populations.  
 
Due to Arctic trade and economic activities, the northern immigration of low-cost labor 
may also alleviate destabilizing pressure in the Southern Hemisphere.  If Arctic economic 
activities do proceed as imagined in this document, then Arctic trade and processing will 
change supply chains and the balance of political and economic power within the tropics 
and Southern Hemisphere. Because such a significant amount of trade is among northern 
hemisphere countries who will now depend more on Arctic routes, the near equatorial 
(Panama) and southern routes (Africa, Indonesia, and S. America) will experience severe 
dislocations, except in possibly the matter of oil and agricultural products. Economies-of-
scale provide a strong incentive to avoid the size restrictions of Panamax ships, 
encouraging shippers to take economic advantage of the larger vessels that can ply the 
Arctic.  
 
With the change in economic relationships and dependency, alliances between 
developing countries and the U.S., China, and others could become quite fluid.  If no 
economic alternative options exist in a country (such as enhanced agriculture, mineral 
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extraction, or the development of new competition-preserving infrastructure), but there is 
adequate labor mobility to reduce internal strife, then the government retrenchments in 
disadvantaged nation-states may avoid regional conflicts. Nonetheless, if multiple 
neighboring countries simultaneously experience enduring downturns, warlords can 
readily take advantage of the situation.  Economically developed areas may be able to 
compete with the Arctic for regionally-produced and regionally-consumed goods.   
 
Climate security risks are not the direct results of separate discrete events such as 
migration or the loss of resources.  Migration may bring constructive economic change to 
a host country and the loss of population may relieve pressures in the donor country. As 
noted previously, risk is not due to a static chain of events, but from the dynamics and 
shifting interactions among the climate, physical, socio-economic, and geo-political 
components. A one-cause, one-effect assessment misses the primary drivers of the risk. 
The magnitude of the cascade of changes determines the need for security measures and 
the prioritization they deserve. 
  
Many of these impacts will require computer modeling of realizable dynamics in 
economic supply chains, societal responses, geopolitical stability, and conflict evolution, 
in addition to the physical climate system.  As triggers for conflict in areas already 
stressed by the economic and environmental fallout of Arctic transformations, the impact 
of natural disasters on water, energy, and infrastructure disruption become important.  
Stresses that intensify destructive land use, deforestation, and non-sustainable agriculture 
practices can generate circumstances that push local societies into a failed-nation status.  
Understanding these dynamics is important to allocating global security efforts and 
ensuring adequate coverage in critical hot spots.  Luckily, post-9/11 events have 






Uncertainty in the timing of an ice-free Arctic affects how quickly it will become a 
security priority. Uncertainty in the emergent extreme and variable weather conditions 
will determine the difficulty (cost) of maintaining adequate security (order) in the area.  
The resolution of sovereignty boundaries (presumably based on UN Convention on the 
Laws of the Sea negotiations) affects the ability to enforce security measures.  The U.S. 
will most probably need a military presence to back-up negotiated sovereignty 
agreements. 
 
Mineral extraction may initiate the “gold rush” to the Arctic, but shipping could jump-
start the economic engine that propels the Arctic into being the next global growth 
engine.  The processing of resources and the finishing of product may become the 
dominate economic activity, dwarfing the mineral and shipping efforts that now primarily 
act to support the global economic supply chain in the Arctic --- centered primarily on  
Russian shores and in Russian waters.  
 
Nonetheless, the multinational corporations creating the economic bounty may affect 
security tensions more than nation-states themselves.   Counties will depend ever more 
heavily on the global supply chains. China has particular needs to protect its trade flows. 
Nation-state and multinational-corporate interests will become heavily intertwined in a 
security sense.  
 
The Arctic environment is both fragile and severe.  Environmental protection constraints 
(laws) may negatively affect security operations, and evolving weather (climate) 
conditions will require an evolving set of assets for security responses.  
 
Once the Arctic does become economically accessible, its importance to security appears 
to be a certainty. The importance of the Arctic to the global economy should make its 
security issues a top priority.   Understanding the timing and extent of security needs, 
along with the strategy to counter the need, consistent with cost and planning constraints, 
will require assessments of uncertainty-weighted risks and optimized planning based on 
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